A disproportionate share of low-skilled U.S. workers is employed by temporary help firms. These firms offer rapid entry into paid employment, but temporary help jobs are typically brief and it is unknown whether they foster longer-term employment. We draw upon an unusual, large-scale policy experiment in the state of Michigan to evaluate whether holding temporary help jobs facilitates labor market advancement for low-skilled workers. To identify these effects, we exploit the random assignment of welfare-to-work clients across numerous welfare service providers in a major metropolitan area. These providers feature substantially different placement rates at temporary help jobs but offer otherwise similar services. We find that moving welfare participants into temporary help jobs boosts their short-term earnings. But these gains are offset by lower earnings, less frequent employment, and potentially higher welfare recidivism over the next one to two years. In contrast, placements in direct-hire jobs raise participants' earnings substantially and reduce recidivism both one and two years following placement. We conclude that encouraging low-skilled workers to take temporary help agency jobs is no more effective -and possibly less effective -than providing no job placements at all.
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A disproportionate share of minority and low-skilled U.S. workers is employed by temporary help firms. In 1999, African American workers were overrepresented in temporary help agency jobs by 86 percent, Hispanics by 31 percent, and high school dropouts by 59 percent; by contrast, college graduates were underrepresented by 47 percent (DiNatale 2002) . Recent analyses of state administrative welfare data reveal that 15 to 40 percent of former welfare recipients who obtained employment in the years following the 1996 U.S. welfare reform took jobs in the temporary help sector.
1 These numbers are especially striking in light of the fact that the temporary help industry accounts for less than 3 percent of average U.S. daily employment.
The concentration of low-skilled workers in the temporary help sector has catalyzed a research and policy debate about whether temporary help jobs foster labor market advancement. One hypothesis is that because temporary help firms face lower screening and termination costs than do conventional, direct-hire employers, they may choose to hire individuals who otherwise would have difficulty finding any employment (Katz and Krueger 1999; Autor and Houseman 2002b; Autor 2003; Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek 2003) . If so, temporary help jobs may reduce the time workers spend in unproductive, potentially discouraging job search and facilitate rapid entry into employment. Moreover, temporary assignments may permit workers to develop human capital and labor market contacts that lead, directly or indirectly, to longer-term jobs. Indeed, a large and growing number of employers use temporary help assignments as a means to screen workers for direct-hire jobs (Abraham 1988; Autor 2001; Houseman 2001; Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden 2003) .
In contrast to this view, numerous scholars and practitioners have argued that temporary help agencies provide little opportunity or incentive for workers to invest in human capital or develop productive job search networks and instead offer workers a series of unstable and primarily low-skilled jobs (Parker 1994; Pawasarat 1997; Jorgenson and Riemer 2000) . In support of this hypothesis, Segal and Sullivan (1997) find that while mobility out of the temporary help sector is high, a disproportionate share 2 of leavers enters unemployment or exits the labor force. If temporary help jobs exclusively substitute for spells of unemployment, these facts would be of little concern. But to the degree that spells in temporary help employment crowd out productive direct-hire job search, they may inhibit longer-term labor advancement. Hence, the short term gains accruing from nearer-term employment in temporary help jobs may be offset by employment instability and poor earnings growth.
Distinguishing among these competing hypotheses is an empirical challenge. The fundamental problem is that there are economically large, but typically unmeasured, differences in skills and motivation of workers taking temporary help and direct-hire jobs, as we show below. Cognizant of these sample-selection problems, several recent studies, summarized below, attempt to identify the effects of temporary help employment on subsequent labor market outcomes among low-skill and low-income populations in the United States. In addition, a parallel European literature evaluates whether temporary help employment, as well as fixed-term contracts, provide a "stepping stone" into stable employment.
Notably, these recent U.S. and European studies, without exception, find that temporary help jobs provide a viable port of entry into the labor market and lead to longer-term labor market advancement.
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In addition to their findings, something these studies have in common is that they draw exclusively on observational data to ascertain causal relationships. That is, the research designs depend upon regression control, matching, selection-adjustment, and structural estimation techniques to account for the likely non-random selection of workers with different earnings capacities into different job types. The veracity of the findings therefore depends critically on the efficacy of these methods for drawing causal inferences from non-experimental data.
In this study, we take an alternative approach to evaluating whether temporary help jobs improve labor market outcomes for low-skilled workers. We exploit a unique, multi-year policy experiment in a large Michigan metropolitan area in which welfare recipients participating in a return-to-work program (Work First) were, in effect, randomly assigned across a large number of service providers (contractors).
As we demonstrate below, Work First participants randomly assigned to different contractors had significantly different placement rates into direct-hire or temporary help jobs but otherwise received similar services. We analyze this randomization using an "intention to treat" framework whereby randomization alters the probabilities that individuals are placed in different types of jobs (direct-hire, temporary-help, non-employment) during their Work First spells.
To assess the labor market consequences of these placements, we use administrative data from the Our primary finding is that "marginal" direct-hire Work First placements -those induced by the random assignment of participants to Work First contractors -increase payroll earnings by several thousand dollars, increase time employed by one to two quarters, and lower the probability of recidivism into the Work First program by 20 percentage points over the subsequent two years. These relationships are significant, consistent across randomization districts, and economically large. By contrast, we find that temporary-help placements improve employment and earnings outcomes only in the very short-term.
Over time horizons of one to two years, temporary help placements do not improve -and quite possibly worsen -these labor market outcomes. Rather than promoting transitions to direct-hire jobs, temporary help placements primarily displace employment andearnings from other (direct-hire) jobs.
We also consider and present strong evidence against two potential threats to validity. One is that the adverse findings we document for temporary help job placements could be driven by a general association between "bad contractor" practices and use of temporary help placements. To address this concern, we 4 first establish that the estimated negative consequences of temporary help placements are evident in almost all of the randomization districts in our sample, and hence that our findings are not driven by the poor practices of one or more aberrant contractors. Second, to explore the concern that there may be other important unmeasured contractor practices (e.g., additional supports and services) that explain the link between contractor random assignments and participants' outcomes, we test and confirm that there is no remaining, significant variation in the effects of Work First contractors on participant outcomes that is not captured by contractor placement rates. Third, we find that direct-hire and temporary agency job placement rates are positively and significantly correlated across contractors, a fact that reduces the plausibility of a scenario in which "bad" contractors primarily place participants in temp agency jobs and "good" contractors primarily place participants in direct-hire jobs. These findings suggest that it is job placement rates themselves -not other confounding factors -that account for our main findings.
A second concern we tackle is the possibility of parameter instability. Because contractors have internal discretion about which clients to encourage toward which job types, our estimates might not necessarily identify a stable "intention to treat" relationship, as would occur if random assignments uniformly raised or lowered the probability that each participant obtained a given job placement (temporary help, direct-hire, non-employment). To address this issue, we exploit the panel structure of the data to analyze the labor market outcomes of participants who experience multiple Work First spells during the sample window and who are assigned to multiple contractors (because of the repeated randomization). Fixed-effects instrumental variables models estimated on this subsample affirm the main findings: using only within-person, over-time variation in outcomes for participants randomly assigned to contractors with differing placement practices, we estimate that direct-hire jobs induced by random assignments raise post-assignment earnings and employment, while temporary help placements retard them. Corroborating this evidence, we demonstrate that "marginal" workers placed in temporary help positions have comparable pre-placement earnings histories to marginal workers placed in direct-hire such consistent results.
5 positions, again indicating that the contrast between the positive labor market outcomes of direct-hire placements and the generally negative outcomes of temporary help placements result from differences in the quality of jobs, not from differences in the quality of workers placed in these jobs.
In addition to presenting findings from models based on the quasi-experiment, we use our detailed administrative data to estimate conventional OLS and fixed-effects models for the relationship between temporary help job-taking and subsequent labor market outcomes. Consistent with the U.S. and European literature above -but opposite to our main, quasi-experimental estimates -OLS and fixed-effects estimates indicate that workers who take temporary help jobs fare almost as well as those taking directhire positions. The contrast with our core findings suggests either that non-experimental estimates are biased by the endemic self-selection of workers into job types according to unmeasured skills and motivation, or that there are substantial differences between the "marginal" treatment effects recovered by our quasi-experiment analysis and "average" treatment effects of temporary help placements observed in non-experimental data. We suggest that the emerging consensus of the U.S. and European literatures that temporary help jobs foster labor market advancement -based wholly on non-experimental evaluationshould be carefully considered in light of the evidence from random assignments. 
Prior evidence and the Michigan Work First quasi-experiment a. Prior non-experimental estimates
The characteristics of workers who take direct-hire and temporary help jobs differ significantly. Even in our relatively homogenous sample, we find that Work First participants who take temporary help jobs are older, more likely to be black, and have higher prior earnings in the temporary help sector than do participants who take direct-hire jobs (see Table 1 ). Not surprisingly, the contrast with those who take no employment during their Work First spell is much more pronounced. These contrasts underscore the 6 difficulty of disentangling the effects of job-taking on subsequent labor market outcomes from the causes that determine what jobs are taken initially.
Several recent studies attempt to overcome problems of sample selection. Lane et al. (2003) use matched propensity score techniques to study the effects of temporary agency employment on the labor market outcomes of low-income workers and those at risk of being on welfare. They cautiously conclude that temporary employment improves labor market outcomes among those who might otherwise have been unemployed, and they suggest the use of temporary help jobs by welfare agencies as a means to improve labor market outcomes. However, they acknowledge that in their Survey of Income and Program
Participation data it was infeasible to construct comparison groups that were well-matched on earnings histories but differed on job types, which led to a potential bias in the estimates.
Using a research population and database closely comparable to the one used in this study, Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005) study the effects of temporary agency employment on subsequent earnings among welfare recipients in two states. To control for possible selection bias in the decision to take a temporary agency job, they estimate a selection model that is identified through the exclusion of various county-specific measures from the models for earnings but not from those for employment. Interestingly, the correction for selection bias has little effect on their regression estimates, suggesting either that the selection problem is unimportant or that their instruments do not adequately control for selection on unobservable variables. 4 Like Lane et al. (2003) , they find that the initial earnings of those taking temporary help jobs are lower than of those taking direct-hire jobs but that they are significantly better than of those who are not employed and tend to converge over two years toward the earnings of those initially taking direct-hire jobs.
An alternative approach, pursued by Ferber and Waldfogel (1998) and Corcoran and Chen (2004) , is to estimate fixed-effects regressions to assess whether individuals who move into temporary-help and other non-traditional jobs generally experience improvements in labor-market outcomes. A virtue of the 7 fixed-effect model is that it will purge time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in individual earnings levels that might otherwise be a source of bias. However, if there is heterogeneity in earnings trajectories (rather than in earnings levels) that is correlated with job-taking behavior, the fixed-effects model will not resolve this bias. 5 As is consistent with other work, the studies by Ferber and Waldfogel (1998) and Corcoran and Chen (2005) find that temporary help and other non-standard work arrangements are associated with improvements in individuals' earnings and employment.
Numerous recent studies have addressed the role of temporary employment in facilitating labor market transitions in Europe. Using propensity score matching methods, Ichino et al. (2004 Ichino et al. ( , 2005 conclude that, relative to starting off unemployed, being in a temporary help job significantly increases the probability of finding permanent employment within 18 months. In a similar vein, Gerfin et al.
(forthcoming) use matching techniques to estimate the effect of subsidized temporary help placements on the labor market prospects of unemployed workers in Switzerland and find significant benefits to these placements. Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002) and García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2002) study the effects on subsequent employment outcomes of temporary (agency and fixed-term) employment in Britain and temporary agency employment in Spain, respectively. Their empirical strategies are similar to those used in Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005) , and they find generally positive effects of temporary employment, as well. Using matching and regression control techniques, studies by Andersson and Wadensjö (2004) , Amuedo-Dorantes, Malo, and Muñoz-Bullón (2005) , and Kvasnicka (2005) also find positive effects of temporary help employment on labor market advancement for workers in Sweden, Spain, and Germany, respectively. Zijl et al. (2004) apply a structural duration model to estimate the effect of temporary help job-taking on durations to direct-hire ("regular") work in the Netherlands and conclude that temporary help jobs substantially reduce unemployment durations and increase subsequent job stability.
5 The fixed-effects estimator is ideally suited to a problem where successive outcome observations for each individual reflect simple deviations from a stable mean, i.e., a fixed, additive error component. But many low-skilled workers, and especially those receiving welfare, are likely to be undergoing significant shifts in labor force trajectory as they transition from non-employment to employment. This heterogeneity in slopes rather than intercepts will not be resolved by the fixed-effects model. In Section 3, we assess whether fixed-effects models resolve the biases stemming from self-selection and conclude that they do not. the contractor to which a participant is assigned depends on the date that he or she applied for benefits. As we demonstrate formally below, this intake procedure is functionally equivalent to random assignment.
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As the name implies, the Work First program focuses on placing participants into jobs quickly. All contractors operating in our metropolitan area offer a fairly standardized one-week orientation that teaches participants basic job-search and life skills. Services such as childcare and transportation are provided by outside agencies and are available on an equal basis to participants at all contractors.
By the second week of the program, participants are expected to search intensively for employment and are formally required to take any job offered to them provided it pays the federal minimum wage and It is logical to ask why contractors' placement practices significantly vary. The most plausible answer is that contractors are uncertain about which types of job placements are most effective and hence pursue different policies. Contractors do not have access to UI wage records data (used in this study to assess participants' labor market outcomes), and they collect follow-up data only for a short time period and only for individuals placed in jobs. Hence, they cannot rigorously assess whether job placements improve participant outcomes or whether specific job placement types matter. During in-person and phone interviews conducted for this study, contractors expressed considerable uncertainty, and differing opinions, about the long-term consequences of temporary job placements (Autor and Houseman 2005) .
We exploit these differences, which impact the probability of temporary agency, direct-hire, or nonemployment among statistically identical populations, to identify the effects of Work First employment 10 and job type on long-term earnings and program recidivism. In our econometric specification, we use contractor assignment as an instrumental variable affecting the probability that a participant obtains a temporary help job, a direct-hire job, or no job during the program.
Our methodology does not assume that contractors have no effect on participant outcomes other than through their effects on job placements -only that any other practices affecting participant outcomes are uncorrelated with contractor placement rates. However, few resources are spent on anything but job development (Autor and Houseman 2005 help, we use the names of employers at which participants obtained jobs in conjunction with carefully compiled lists of temporary help agencies in the metropolitan area. 9 In a small number of cases where the appropriate coding of an employer was unclear, we collected additional information on the nature of the business through an internet search or telephone contact. We also use the administrative data to calculate the implied weekly earnings for each Work First job by multiplying the hourly wage rate by weekly hours.
The UI data include total earnings in the quarter and the industry in which the individual had the most earnings in the quarter. We use them to construct pre-and post-Work First UI earnings for each participant for the four to eight quarters prior to and subsequent to the Work First placement.
10
In 14 of the districts in the metropolitan area, two or more Work First contractors served the district over the time period studied. In two districts, however, one contractor in each district was designated to serve primarily ethnic populations, and participants were allowed to choose contractors based on language needs. We drop these two districts from our sample. We further limit the sample to spells initiated when participants were between the ages of 16 and 64 and drop spells where reported pre-or post-assignment quarterly UI earnings values exceed $15,000 in a single calendar quarter. These restrictions reduce the sample by less than 1 percent. Finally, we drop all spells initiated in a calendar quarter in any district where one or more participating contractors received no clients during the quarter, as occasionally occurred when contractors were terminated and replaced.
11 Table 1 summarizes the means of variables on demographics, work history, and earnings following program entry for all Work First participants in our primary sample as well as by program outcome:
direct-hire job, temporary help job, or no job. The sample is predominantly female (94 percent) and black (97 percent). Slightly under half (47 percent) of Work First spells resulted in job placements. Among spells resulting in jobs, 20 percent have at least one job with a temporary agency. The average earnings and total quarters of employment over the four quarters following program entry are comparable for those 10 The UI wage records exclude earnings of federal and state employees and of the self-employed.
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obtaining temporary agency and direct-hire jobs, while earnings and quarters of employment for those who do not obtain employment during the Work First spell are 40 to 50 percent lower.
The average characteristics of participants vary considerably according to job outcome. Those who do not find jobs while in Work First are more likely to have dropped out of high school, to have worked fewer quarters before entering the program, and to have lower prior earnings than those who find jobs.
Among those placed in jobs, those taking temporary agency jobs actually have somewhat higher average prior earnings and quarters worked than those taking direct-hire jobs. Not surprisingly, those who take temporary jobs while in the Work First program have higher prior earnings and more quarters worked in the temporary help sector than those who take direct-hire jobs. Data used in previous studies show that blacks are much more likely than whites to work in temporary agency jobs (Autor and Houseman 2002b; Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske 2005) . Even in our predominantly African-American sample, we also find this relationship.
The table reveals one further noteworthy pattern: hourly wages, weekly hours, and weekly earnings are uniformly higher for participants in temporary help jobs than for those in direct-hire jobs. This pattern stands in contrast to the widely reported finding of lower wages in temporary help positions (Segal and Sullivan 1998; General Accounting Office 2000; DiNatale 2001) . Although it is possible that this pattern is specific to the regional labor market we study, many studies that report lower earnings for temporary help agency jobs, including Segal and Sullivan (1998) , rely on quarterly unemployment insurance records which report total earnings but not hours of work. Because temporary help jobs are generally transitory, the absence of hours information in UI data may lead to the inference that temporary help jobs pay lower hourly wages when in fact they simply provide fewer total hours.
b. Testing the efficacy of the random assignment
If Work First assignments are functionally equivalent to random assignment, observed characteristics of clients assigned to contractors within a randomization district should be statistically indistinguishable.
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We test the random assignment across contractors within randomization district for each program year by comparing the following ten participant characteristics : gender, white race, other (non-white) race, age, elementary-school-only education, post-elementary high-school drop-out education, number of quarters worked in the eight quarters before program entry, number of quarters primarily employed with a temporary agency in these prior eight quarters, total earnings in these prior eight quarters, and total earnings in the prior eight quarters from quarters where a temporary agency was the primary employer.
With ten participant characteristics, we are likely to obtain many false rejections of the null (i.e., Type I errors), and this is exacerbated by the fact that not all participant characteristics are independent (e.g., less educated participants are more likely to be minorities). To resolve these confounding factors, we use a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) system to estimate the probability that the observed distribution of participant covariates across contractors within each randomization district and year is consistent with chance. 13 The SUR accounts for both the multiple comparisons (ten) simultaneously in each district and the correlations among demographic characteristics across participants at each contractor. (1)
Here, dt X is a stacked set of the participant covariates, the set of control variables include contractor assignment dummies and a constant, and ψ is a matrix of error terms that allows for cross-equation correlations among participant characteristics within district-contractor cells. 14 The p-value for the joint 14 significance of the elements of Z in this regression system provides an omnibus test for the null hypothesis that participant covariates do not differ among participants assigned to different contractors within a district and year; a high p-value corresponds to an acceptance of this null. Table 2 , the overall p-value of the randomization across all 41 cells in our samples is 0.33, with 587 degrees of freedom. Moreover, the null of participant balance across contractors within districts is accepted at the 5 percent level or better in each of the 12 districts and in all four years of the sample. In sum, the data appear to affirm the efficacy of the random assignment.
c. The effect of contractor assignments on job placements
Our research design also requires that contractor random assignments significantly affect participant job placement outcomes. To test whether this occurs, we estimated a set of SUR models akin to equation
(1) where the dependent variables are participant Work First job outcomes (direct-hire, temporary help, non-employment). These tests provide strong support for the efficacy of the research design: all tests of contractor-assignment effects on participant job placements -either across contractors within a year or within contractors across years -reject the null at the 1 percent level or better. The omnibus test for all 41 comparisons also rejects the null at well below the 1 percent level.
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Are the effects of randomization on participant job placement outcomes economically large in addition to being statistically significant? To answer this question, we calculate partial R-squared values from a set of regressions of each job placement outcome on the random assignment dummy variables.
These partial-R-squared values are 0.019 for any employment, 0.013 for temporary help employment, and 0.011 for direct-hire employment. We benchmark these values against the partial R-squared values from a set of regressions of the three job placement outcomes on all other pre-determined covariates in our estimates including the ten demographic and earnings history variables discussed above and a complete set of district-by-year and calendar-year-by-quarter of assignment dummies. The partial-R-squared values for these pre-determined covariates are 0.036 for any employment, 0.024 for temporary help employment, and 0.026 for direct-hire employment. A comparison of the two sets of partial R-squared values shows that the random assignments explain 40 to 55 percent as much of the variation in job placement outcomes among participants as do the combined effects of demographics, earnings history, and district and time effects. We conclude that the economic magnitude of the randomization on job-taking outcomes is substantial.
Main results: The effects of job placements on earnings and employment
We now use the linked quarterly earnings records from the state of Michigan's unemployment insurance system to assess how Work First job placements affect participants' earnings and employment over the subsequent eight calendar quarters following random assignment. 17 Our primary empirical model is: condition that is (almost) guaranteed to be satisfied by the randomization. The second condition is that contractor-by-year random effects are mean independent of contractor placement rates, i.e.,
It is therefore not problematic for our estimation strategy if contractors have significant effects on participant outcomes through mechanisms other than job placements (e.g., other
activities and supports) provided that these effects are not systematically related to contractor job placement rates. We proceed for now under the assumption that this condition is satisfied and examine corroborating evidence in Section 4.
a. Ordinary least squares estimates
To facilitate comparisons with earlier empirical work, we begin our analysis with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Equation (2). The first two columns of Table 3 presents OLS estimates of Equation (2) 
b. Instrumental variables estimates
The preceding OLS estimates are consistent with existing research, most notably with Heinrich et al. (2005) , who find that Missouri and North Carolina welfare recipients taking temporary help jobs earn almost as much over the subsequent two years as those obtaining direct-hire employment -and much more than non-job-takers. Like Heinrich et al., our primary empirical models for earnings and employment contain relatively rich controls, including prior (pre-assignment) earnings and standard demographic variables. 21 Instrumental variables estimates for the labor market consequences of Work First placements appear initially to be consistent with the OLS models. The 2SLS models in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 confirm an economically large and statistically significant earnings gain accruing from Work First job placements during the first post-assignment quarter. The estimated gain to a Work First job placement, $559 ( 5.8 t = ), is about 25 percent less than the analogous OLS estimate.
When job placements are disaggregated by employment types, however, discrepancies emerge.
Temporary help and direct-hire job placements are estimated to raise quarter one earnings by $460 and 20 To include UI outcomes for eight calendar quarters following assignment, we must drop all Work First spells initiated after 2002. This reduces the sample to 27,029 spells.
21 All of our main models control for demographic and earnings history covariates as well as for time and district dummies and their interaction. OLS (but not IV) estimates of wage and employment effects of direct-hire and temporary-help placements are about 20 percent larger when these demographic and earnings history controls are excluded (estimates available from the authors).
$622 respectively. Both are statistically significant. While available precision does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that these point estimates are drawn from the same distribution ( 0.49 p = ), it is noteworthy that the IV estimate for the earnings gain from temporary help placements is approximately 25 percent smaller than the wage gain for direct-hire jobs. Comparable 2SLS models for quarters of employment (rather than earnings) confirm important differences in the employment consequences of temporary help and direct-hire job placements. Placements in direct-hire jobs raise the probability of any employment in the first post-assignment quarter by 36 percentage points ( 6.1 t = ). By contrast, placements in temporary help jobs raise the probability of first quarter employment by only 12 percentage points. This point estimate is not distinguishable from zero ( 1.7 t = ), but it is significantly different from the point estimate for direct-hire placements.
When the wage and employment analysis is extended beyond the first post-assignment quarter, a far more substantial disparity is evident. In the first four calendar quarters following assignment, Work First clients placed in temporary help jobs earn $2,470 less than those receiving a direct-hire placement and $306 less than those receiving no placement at all (though this latter contrast is insignificant). Estimates for quarters of employment tell a comparable story. Direct-hire placements raise total quarters employed by 0.90 over the subsequent four calendar quarters ( 6.5 t = ), while temporary help placements have an economically small and statistically insignificant effect on total quarters worked in the first year.
Examining outcomes over a two-year period following Work First assignment ( To better understand the disparate impacts of temporary help and direct-hire job placements, we explore the dynamics underlying these outcomes. We first estimate a set of 2SLS models that distinguish between employment and earnings in temporary help versus direct-hire jobs. Specifically, we estimate a variant of Equation (2) where the dependent variable is earnings or employment in temporary help employment or direct-hire employment. Participants not receiving earnings or employment in the relevant sector are coded as zero for these outcome measures.
23 Table 5 shows that marginal temp workers earn an additional $999 and work an additional 0.48 quarters in temporary help jobs in the first calendar year following random assignment. (Both are significant.) However, these gains in temporary help earnings and employment appear to come at the expense of earnings and employment in direct-hire jobs. We estimate that temporary help placements displace $1,486 in direct-hire earnings and 0.48 quarters in direct-hire employment in the first year. On net, the first-quarter benefits to temporary help placements, clearly apparent in Table 4 , wash out entirely over the first year. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 5 , direct-hire placements continue to have large positive and significant impacts on direct-hire earnings and employment in the second post-assignment year, whereas temporary help placements have no statistically significant effect on employment and earnings in either direct-hire or temporary agency jobs over this horizon. Thus, the positive short-term benefits of temporary help placements displayed in Table 3 derive entirely from increased employment in 22 The standard errors that we estimate above cannot simultaneously account for the clustering of errors among participants assigned to a contractor and the clustering of errors across time within the same individual. We evaluate the importance of serial correlation by estimating key models using only the first Work First spell per participant. These first-spell estimates, shown in Appendix Table 1 , are closely comparable to our main models for earnings and employment in Table 3 . Notably, given the onethird reduction in sample size, the slight reduction in the precision of the estimates indicates that the precision of our primary estimates is not substantially affected by serial correlation. 23 For a small set of cases, the industry code is missing from the UI data (though we do measure total earnings and employment). These observations are included in the Table 5 analysis but the outcome measures are coded as zero for both direct-hire and temporary-help earnings and employment. Consequently, the the temporary help sector; we find no evidence that temporary agency placements help workers transition to direct-hire jobs.
To further explore the dynamics of job placement and job holding, we also examine how job placement type affects Work First program recidivism. Using Work First administrative data, we implement a variant of Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a participant returns to Work First within 360 or 720 days of the commencement of the prior spell. As shown in Table 1 , 36 percent of the Work First spells result in welfare program recidivism in Michigan within one year and 51 percent lead to reentry within two years. Table 6 shows that participants who obtain jobs during their Work First spells are substantially less likely to recidivate within a year or two.
Those taking direct-hire jobs are 12 and 11 percentage points less likely to recidivate over one and two years, respectively (33 and 22 percent less than average). Those taking temporary help jobs are 7 and 5 percentage points (19 and 10 percent) less likely to recidivate over one and two years. These OLS models are unlikely to reveal causal relationships.
When we estimate the recidivism models using Work First random assignments as instruments for job attainment, we find that only direct-hire jobs reduce the probability of recidivism. Point estimates for temporary help jobs are positive, indicating a higher probability of recidivism, but neither is significant.
However, we can readily reject the null hypothesis that the effects of direct-hire and temporary help job placements on two-year recidivism are equivalent. Thus, consistent with the findings pertaining to employment and earnings, only direct-hire placements appear to help participants reduce program recidivism, presumably because they most likely to lead to stable employment. 
Bad jobs or bad contractors?
A potential objection to the interpretation of our core results is that they may conflate the effect of contractor quality with the effect of job type. Imagine, for example, that low quality Work First contractors -that is, contractors who generally provide poor services -place a disproportionate share of their randomly assigned participants in temporary help jobs, perhaps because these jobs are easiest to locate. Also assume for the sake of argument that temporary help jobs have the same causal effect on employment and earnings as direct-hire jobs. Under these assumptions, our 2SLS estimates will misattribute the effect of receiving a bad contractor assignment to the effect of obtaining a temporary help job. Our causal model assumes that contractors systematically affect participant outcomes only through job placements, not through other quality differentials. The above scenario violates this assumption since it implies that ( ) 0
We view the "bad contractor" scenario as improbable. Based on a survey of Work First contractors serving this metropolitan area (Autor and Houseman 2005) , we document that program funding is tight and few resources are spent on anything but job development. A standardized program of general or life skills training is provided in the first week of the program at all contractors. After the first week, all contractors focus on job placement. Support services intended to aid job retention, such as childcare and transportation, are equally available to participants from all contractors and are provided outside the program. It also bears emphasis that direct-hire and temporary agency job placement rates are positively and significantly correlated across contractors, implying that contractors with high job placement rates tend to be strong on both placement margins; this fact reduces the plausibility of a scenario in which "bad" contractors primarily place participants in temp agency jobs and "good" contractors primarily place participants in direct-hire jobs. 25 Nevertheless, we believe the bad contractor concern deserves close scrutiny and so provide two formal checks on it below.
a. Exploiting the 12 experiments to gauge the consistency of the estimates
A first test is to reestimate our main models separately for each of the 12 randomization districts in our sample. If the aggregate results are driven by outlying contractors or aberrant randomization districts, these models will reveal this fact. Appendix Table 2a presents OLS and 2SLS models by district for the two-way contrast between employment and non-employment. As is consistent with the pooled, district estimates in Table 3 , eight of 12 2SLS point estimates for the effect of job placements on earnings are positive and five are statistically significant. Of the three negative point estimates, none is statistically significant (though one is marginally so). Similarly, 11 of 12 2SLS estimates for the effects of job placement on quarters of employment are positive and eight are statistically significant.
In Appendix Table 2b , we provide estimates for the contrast between direct-hire employment, temporary help employment and non-employment. These estimates use the sub-sample of districts (7 of 12) where participants were randomly assigned among three contractors during at least some part of the three-year sample window. The results, summarized in Figure 1 , provide consistent support for the main inferences. In five of seven randomization districts, the point estimate for the effect of temporary-help placements on four-quarter earnings is substantially less positive (or more negative) than for direct-hire placements (by at least $2,000), and three of these five contrasts are significant. 26 Similarly, the estimated effect of direct-hire placements on four-quarter employment exceeds that of temporary-help placements in six of seven districts, and three of these contrasts are statistically significant. These disaggregated estimates confirm that our core findings reflect a robust and pervasive feature of the data.
b. A test of contractor heterogeneity
As noted above, a survey of contractors failed to uncover systematic differences in contractor practices aside from differences in their job placement rates. Here, we provide a formal test of the existence of other differences in contractor practices that affect participant outcomes. Referring to equation (3), the reduced form version of our main estimating equation, the presence of sizable contractor heterogeneity in earnings or employment outcomes (large 2 ν σ ) indicates that contractors have substantial 25 The correlation between contractor-by-year temporary help and direct-hire placement rates is 0.241 ( .02 p = ). A regression of direct-hire placement rates on temporary help placement rates, year dummies, and a constant yields a coefficient on the temporary help placement rate variable of 0.389 ( .01 p = ). There are 100 contractor-by-year cells and 40 district-by-year dummy variables plus an intercept. This leaves 59 contractor-byyear dummies as instruments. The F-test of these restrictions is distributed F(J-M, N-J), where N is the total count of observations, J is the number of parameters in the unrestricted model, and J-M is the number of parameters in the restricted model. 28 By contrast, when placement rates are parameterized using a single placement measure that does not distinguish between temporary help and direct-hire jobs (
), the F-test rejects the null at the 7 percent level for both outcome measures.
25
policies to contractor job placement rates unless these other contractor policies are virtually collinear with job placement rates -a possibility that we view as highly unlikely.
Interpreting the parameter estimates a. Instrumental variables fixed-effects estimates
One complication for the interpretation of our estimates is that contractors may exercise discretion about which of their randomly assigned participants to encourage toward temporary-help and direct-hire jobs. For example, some contractors may encourage the most "work-ready" participants to obtain temporary help jobs and others the least work-ready. If contractors follow substantially different practices regarding the types of individuals they refer to temporary help and direct-hire jobs and if treatment effects are strongly heterogeneous within the Work First population (i.e., a particular job type has quite different effects on different individuals), our estimates, while still unbiased, will identify an unknown interaction of job placements and unobserved worker quality.
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To address this concern, we ideally would repeatedly randomize job placements for the same Work First participants to form within-person, cross job-type (temporary help, direct-hire, none) contrasts in employment outcomes. Fortuitously, an exercise akin to this is feasible in our sample. Using the panel structure of the research database, we can estimate fixed-effects versions of our main 2SLS models using the sub-sample of participants who experience multiple Work First spells during the sample window and who are assigned to multiple contractors (because of the repeated randomization). Because of the inclusion of individual fixed effects, these models identify the coefficients of interest using only withinperson, over-time variation in outcomes for participants randomly assigned to contractors with differing placement practices.
30
Fixed effects estimates of the causal effects of job placements on employment and earnings, shown in Table 7 , are remarkably similar to 2SLS estimates that do not include fixed effects. In fact, the most notable difference is that inclusion of fixed effects enhances the precision of the estimates. Consistent with our main estimates in Tables 3 and 4 , pooled and fixed-effects 2SLS models estimated on the multiple-spell sample indicate that direct-hire placements raise four-quarter earnings and employment substantially -by $2,301 and 0.75 quarters respectively in the fixed-effects 2SLS models -while temporary help placements have consistently negative (though typically insignificant) impacts on both outcomes. 31 The close comparability of the pooled and fixed-effects 2SLS estimates indicates that our main estimates accurately portray the person-level effects of job placements on post-assignment earnings and employment.
For comparison with prior fixed-effects estimates of the effect of temporary help jobs on the earnings of low-skilled workers (e.g., Segal and Sullivan 1997, 1998; Ferber and Waldfogel 1998; Corcoran and Chen 2004), we also present in Table 7 
b. Who is the marginal worker?
The preceding analysis establishes that our estimates capture the effects of job placements on individual worker outcomes. In this final section, we explore the characteristics of the "marginal" temporary agency and direct-hire workers for whom these outcomes are estimated. While it is not 31 In this case, the estimated four-quarter earnings loss of $1,265 for a temporary help placement is statistically significant. possible to individually identify the participants whose employment outcomes are directly altered by the quasi-experiment -since we cannot know who would have had a different job outcome if assigned to a different contractor -it is feasible to characterize key attributes of the affected population.
Consider the following regression model:
Here, X is a predetermined participant characteristic of interest (e.g., pre-assignment earnings or Table 8 show that participants who found any employment during their Work First spell earned an average of $4,685 and worked 2.15 quarters in the four calendar quarters prior to random assignment.
Column (2) shows that the prior earnings and labor force participation of participants who took temporary help and direct-hire jobs during their Work First spells are quite comparable to one another (see also Table 1 ). The one notable difference between the two groups is that participants who took temporary help jobs during their Work First spells had significantly higher earnings and employment in the temporary help sector over the previous four quarters than those who took direct-hire placements (and lower directhire earnings and employment by approximately offsetting amounts).
Now consider 2SLS estimates of equation (4) where the variables T and D are instrumented by contractor and year-of-assignment dummies. In this case, 1 2 and κ κ estimate the average characteristics ( ' X s ) of "marginal workers," that is, participants whose employment status is changed by the random assignment (Abadie 2003) . To see this, consider a simplified case with only employment outcome, {0,1} J ∈ , and a single instrumental variable, {0,1} Z ∈ , that affects the odds that a randomly assigned participant obtains employment during her spell. Assume that the standard Local Average Treatment Effect assumptions are satisfied (Imbens and Angrist 1994) , and in particular that random assignment to treatment ( 1 Z = ) weakly increases the odds that each participant obtains employment during her Work First spell. In this case, a Wald estimate of Equation (4) yields the following quantity:
The numerator of this expression is a scaled contrast between the average X of employed participants in the treatment and control groups. The denominator rescales this contrast by the effect of the random assignment on employment odds. The ratio of these two expressions provides an estimate of the average X of marginal workers -workers whose employment status was changed by the random assignment.
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Two-stage least squares estimates of Equation (4), found in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8, establish two key results. First, the earnings histories of "marginal workers" are significantly weaker than those of average workers. Specifically, prior-year earnings of marginal workers are about $500 below those of average workers while prior-year labor force participation is lower by between 0.05 and 0.15 quarters.
Hausman tests for the equality of OLS and 2SLS coefficients (bottom row of each panel) confirm that these differences in earnings histories are statistically significant. It thus appears that random assignments alter employment outcomes among Work First participants by moving those with relatively weak earnings histories into or out of the labor force, which appears eminently sensible.
The second result established in Table 8 is that there are no significant differences between the preplacement work histories of marginal temporary workers and marginal direct hires. Both groups have 32 A simple numerical example illustrates. Let X be a dummy variable equal to one if a participant is a high-school dropout and zero otherwise. Assume that 20 percent of treated participants and 10 percent of control participants find jobs during their Work First spells. Also assume that 70 percent of treated participants who find jobs are high school dropouts versus 50 percent of untreated participants. If one uses Equation (4), these numbers imply that 90 percent of marginally employed are high school dropouts. The intuition for this result is that the marginal 10 percent of employed participants must be composed of 90 percent high school dropouts to raise the average high school dropout share among employed from 50 to 70 percent among the treated group.
weaker prior earnings and employment histories than "average" workers, but they do not differ significantly from one another. 33 (Although, notably, prior earnings and employment in the temporary help sector are higher among marginal temporary help workers than among marginal direct-hire workers, and this contrast approaches statistical significance.) The near comparability of the marginal temporary help and direct-hire populations is important for the interpretation of our main findings because it indicates that the employment effects of direct-hire and temporary help jobs measured above are estimated on similar populations. We therefore conclude that "marginal temporary help workers" in our sample would likely have fared significantly better had they instead been randomized into direct-hire jobs, and vice versa for "marginal direct hires." 34
Conclusion
The primary finding of our analysis is that direct-hire placements induced by the random assignment of low-skilled workers to Work First contractors significantly increase payroll earnings and quarters of employment for marginal participants -by several thousand dollars over the subsequent two years. This effect of direct-hire placements on post-assignment earnings and employment is significant, consistent across randomization districts, and economically large. By contrast, we find that although temporary help placements increase participants' earnings over the near term, these placements do not raise -and may quite possibly lower -payroll earnings and quarters of employment of Work First clients over the one-totwo years following placement. These adverse findings for payroll earnings are robust across many permutations of sampled districts and post-assignment time intervals in our data. They are corroborated by evidence from Work First administrative records that marginal temporary help placements, unlike marginal direct-hire placements, do not lower and possibly raise Work First recidivism. 33 Estimates akin to those in Table 8 for the demographic characteristics of marginal versus average workers (available from the authors), indicate that "marginal temps" are slightly more likely than average temporary workers or marginal direct-hires to be female or non-white. These contrasts are statistically significant but economically small -no larger than 5 percentage points.
Why do temporary help placements appear to provide (at best) no long-term benefits to Work First participants? Our leading hypothesis is that temporary help assignments displace other productive jobsearch and employment opportunities. Because the short-term earnings gains from temporary help jobs are offset over time by forgone earnings in direct-hire employment, it appears that temporary help placements primarily serve to displace future direct-hire employment rather than to help workers transition to direct-hire jobs. Moreover, although never statistically significant, 2SLS coefficient estimates of the effects of temporary help placements on earnings over the subsequent one to two year period are always negative -and estimated effects on Work-First recidivism always positive -suggesting that in some cases participants may be better off passing up temporary help positions and continuing to search for better, possibly direct-hire, jobs.
We emphasize that our results pertain to the 'marginal' temporary help job placements induced by the randomization of Work First clients across contractors. Our analysis does not preclude the possibility that infra-marginal temporary help placements generate significant benefits. Nevertheless, our findings are particularly germane for the design of welfare programs. The operative question for program design is whether job programs assisting welfare and other low-wage workers can improve participants' labor market outcomes by placing more clients in temporary agency positions. Our analysis suggests not. While several researchers have advocated greater use of temporary help agencies in job placement programs to help welfare and low-wage workers transition to employment (Lane et al. 2003; Holzer 2004; Andersson et al. 2005) , we conclude that such a policy prescription is premature.
Finally, our research speaks to the growing European literature that finds that temporary help and other non-standard work arrangements serve as effective "stepping stones" into the labor market.
Although we do not presume that results for low-skilled U.S. workers apply generally to these disparate labor markets and worker populations, it is notable that comparable non-experimental methodologies applied to the same empirical question in the United States and Europe produce comparable findingsnamely, that temporary help jobs foster positive labor market outcomes. Notably, we also obtain results comparable to these prior studies when we apply conventional OLS and fixed-effects models to our data.
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Our quasi-experimental evidence suggests that these non-experimental methods may be inadequate to resolve the endemic self-selection of workers into job types according to unmeasured skills and motivation. We conclude that the emerging consensus of the U.S. and European literatures that temporary help jobs foster labor market advancement -based wholly on non-experimental evaluation -should be reconsidered in light of the evidence from random assignments. Each cell provides the chi-squared value, degrees of freedom, p-value and number of observations for the null hypothesis that the 10 main sample covariates are balanced across clients assigned to Work First contractors within the relevant randomization district × year cell. Covariates tested are gender, white race, other race, age, primary school educaiton, post-primary high school dropout education, total quarters employed and total employent earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment, total quarters employed in temporary help agency work and total temporary help agency earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment. Far column and bottom row provide analogous test statistics pooling across districts either within a year or across years within a district. Bottom righthand cell provides the chi-square test for all districts and years simultaneously. Cells marked "n/a" indicate that there was only one contractor operating in the district during most or all of the indicated year.
(1) 
2SLS
First Quarter All models include year × quarter of assignment and randomization district × year of assignment dummy variables, and controls for age and its square, gender, race, sum of UI earnings and UI quarters worked in four quarters prior to Work First assignment, and four education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than high school, and education unknown). Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 27,029 Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment × year. All models include year × quarter of assignment and randomization district × year of assignment dummy variables, and controls for age and its square, gender, race, sum of UI earnings and UI quarters worked in four quarters prior to Work First assignment and four education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than high school, and education unknown).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 16,024 spells (6,053 participants) Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment × year. All models include individual participant fixed effects, year × quarter of assignment and randomization-district × year of assignment dummy variables, and controls for age and its square. Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 5,016 Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment × year. All models include year × quarter of assignment and randomization district × year of assignment dummy variables, and controls for age and its square, gender, race, sum of UI earnings and UI quarters worked in four quarters prior to Work First assignment, and four education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than high school, and education unknown). Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 
